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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TERRELL W. GUIFF, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs . 
GINA TAYLOR, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Supreme Court No. 910114 
Priority No. 16 
APPELLEE'S RESPONSIVE BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On January 24, 1990, Janet Guiff, a Utah resident, died 
intestate. Plaintiff/Appellee is the surviving spouse of Janet 
Guiff, who is also survived by a son whose whereabouts are unknown 
to either party. Defendant/Appellant is the sister of the 
deceased, Janet Guiff. (See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
law, hereinafter designated "FFCL, p.2) 
On the date of Janet Guiff's death, plaintiff was in lawful 
possession of certain jewelry and personal property owned by 
decedent and located in plaintiff's home. About two weeks after 
his wife's funeral, plaintiff gave defendant a key to his home and 
told defendant she could remove and keep the decedent's clothing. 
("FFCL" pp.2-4.) 
On July 24, 1990, Plaintiff/Appellee filed a complaint 
for conversion and replevin of the jewelry and requested attorney's 
fees, costs and punitive damages. Both parties filed and answered 
interrogatories without objection or request for a more definite 
answer. 
Defendant swore in an affidavit and testified at trial that 
plaintiff invited her to his home after his wife's death, was 
present when she found the decedent's jewelry in a purse, and gave 
the jewelry to her. Defendant testified that after plaintiff had 
given her decedent's jewelry, he asked her to have sex with him; 
when she refused, he demanded the jewelry back, (See Defendant's 
August 1, 1990, affidavit, p.2; TR 18-20, 25-29, 33-34.) 
The trial court found defendant entered plaintiff's home, 
unlawfully removed and converted decedent's jewelry, specifically 
set forth in the court's ruling on valuations, and that plaintiff 
did not make a gift of any portion <?f his wife's jewelry or assist 
or participate in defendant's taking, conversion and sale of the 
jewelry. ("FFCL" pp. 3-4.) Moreover, the trial judge found 
defendant's testimony perjurious, completely lacking in credibility 
and ruled: "That the conduct of defendant, Tina Taylor, was 
unlawful, knowing, and intentional, and in addition thereto, said 
Tina Taylor at the time of trial falsely testified about the taking 
conversion of the jewelry and further falsely testified about the 
number of items taken from plaintiff's home." ("FFCL" p. 4.) 
On February 7, 1991, defendant's motion for a new trial was 
denied. As noted by "appellant (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 6), in 
his denial of defendant's motion for a new trial, the trial judge 
stated the following: "In fact, the Court did not state it was 
finding by a preponderance of the evidence. In this case, the 
evidence was so one sided that the Court could have found the 
evidence against the defendant, Gina Taylor, beyond all reasonable 
doubt." 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL WAS CORRECT 
The "key" issue appellant raises on appeal is not the trial 
court's failure to grant his motion for a new trial, but counsel's 
own failure to question his client prior to trial. 
Appellant's remedy for defective discovery, if any, is either 
to follow the procedures set forth in Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 33, subsection (a), and move the trial court for an 
order to compel discovery, under Rule 37, subsection (a), with 
respect to any failure to answer interrogatories, or move the trial 
court to order sanctions, under Rule 26, subsection (g) , for 
unsigned answers, (Kusy v. K Mart Apparel, (Utah 1984) 681 P.2d 
232; WW & WB Gardner Ins. v. Park W. Village, (Utah 1977) 568 P. 2d 
734.) 
Appellant complains on appeal that the following answer to his 
interrogatory: 
"5. Did you hand over the jewelry of Janet Guiff to 
defendant, Tina Taylor? If not, explant (sic) how she got 
it?" "ANSWER: No. Plaintiff understands that defendant, Tina 
Taylor removed said property from the home of plaintiff and 
Janet Guiff, but without authorization of either party." 
is "a total and deceptive failure to answer" and attempts to 
buttress this spurious argument on his claim that plaintiff's 
explanation of how defendant got into his home was the "key" to his 
case (Appellant's Opening Brief, hereinafter designated "AOB", pp. 
7-9) . 
Defendant's particular method of entering plaintiff's home had 
marginal, if any, relevance to the issues at trial. Appellant 
claims that: "(i)n preparation for trial counsel questioned 
defendant extensively about how she could have possibly got the 
jewelry out of plaintiff's residence without his knowledge because 
plaintiff did not have a reasonable explanation on this point. 
Defendant did not tell her counsel about the key, and her counsel 
never asked her about the keys." (AOB p. 9.) However, plaintiff's 
consent for defendant to enter his home and remove the decedent's 
clothing was never disputed. It was defendant's perjurious 
testimony that plaintiff gave her his deceased wife's jewelry 
shortly after the funeral in exchange for sex and fraud as to the 
items and value of the jewelry that rightly incensed the trial 
court. The trial judge awarded punitive damages and found that 
"... the evidence was so one sided that the court could have found 
the evidence against the defendant, Gina Taylor, beyond all 
reasonable doubt." 
It is well-established that sanctions may lie for any alleged 
failure to answer interrogatories (WR Skousen Contractors v. 
Chatter, (Ariz. 1975) 536 P.2d 722; Moses v. Moses, (Colo. 1973) 
505 P.2d 1302), to sign answers to interrogatories (Kusy v. K Mart 
Apparel, (Utah 1984) 681 P. 2d 1232) or to produce documents for 
inspection (WW & WB Gardner v. Park West Village, (Utah 1977) 568 
P.2d 734), are vested with trial court, which is given a wide 
latitude of discretionary power. (See also G.M. Leasing Corp. v. 
Murray Thrift, (Utah 1975) 567 P.2d 179, 180; Jensen v. Baughman, 
(Utah 1977) 563 P.2d 179; Tucker Realty v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 
(Utah 1972) 495 P.2d 1254. Defendant raised this issue of the 
alleged defective answer in his motion for a new trial which was 
denied on February 7, 1991. 
Any error in plaintiff's failure to explicitly describe 
defendant's entry into his home, assuming he had knowledge of how 
she entered his home, and further assuming the fact was even 
relevant, was either waived by defendant's failure to object and/or 
request sanctions at trial, or was determined by the trial court to 
be invited, harmless and inconsequential error. Appellant had 
ample opportunity, even during trial, to object to what he claims 
now was a "defective answer." Appellants counsel is certainly 
charged with knowledge of appellant. Counsel's failure to query 
his own client as to how she entered the house should not be 
ascribed as some deceitful answer by plaintiff to somehow dignify 
an otherwise irrelevant issue into grounds for an appeal. 
POINT II 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT WERE SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE AND WERE WELL WITHIN 
THE TRIAL COURTS DISCRETION 
Appellant concedes that findings by the trial court will not 
be set aside on appeal unless "clearly erroneous." Appellant cites 
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989) for the 
proposition that any finding by the trial court must be articulated 
with detail sufficient to permit review by a court of appeal. The 
court in Reid noted: 
"To mount a successful challenge to the correctness of a trial 
court's findings of fact, an appellant must first marshal 
the evidence supporting the finding and then demonstrate that 
the evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings 
even in viewing in the light most favorable to the court 
below, (cites omitted) The legal sufficiency of the evidence 
is determined by the standard set out in civil rule 52(a), 
which provides: "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." 
Also see Butler v. Lee, 774 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1989). 
As appellant notes in her brief, the trial court in this case 
made appropriate valuations from plaintiff's testimony, 
miscellaneous documents, receipts and other papers. The court made 
a specific ruling on valuation of the items appellant complains of 
on December 12, 1990 and set forth valid reasons therefore. Such 
ruling was supported by the evidence and explained by the court. 
Other than dissatisfaction, appellant fails to demonstrate that the 
valuations were not supported by the evidence, that they were 
clearly erroneous, or that the court abused its discretion in 
finding that appellant lied. Accordingly, there exists more than 
an ample basis for the court's findings in this matter. 
POINT III. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE APPROPRIATE 
AND CERTAINLY NOT EXCESSIVE IN THIS MATTER. 
The trial court found appellant liable for an intentional tort 
of conversion o f property of appellee and in addition thereto, 
falsely testified about the conversion and the extent of the 
property converted. The court found that appellant converted 
property in an amount of $7,598.00 and awarded punitive damages in 
an amount of $3,000.00. Such an award is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and is certainly not disproportionate 
to the injury and actual damage. 
Appellant further complains that the burden of proof required 
for an award of punitive damages is wrong. Regardless of 
appellant's opinion, the law is clear and the court followed the 
law as it is obliged to do. 
POINT IV. 
PLAINTIFF COULD NOT HAVE JOINED 
AN UNAVAILABLE PARTY 
Appellant argues that plaintiff was required to join an 
unavailable party and that his failure to do so deprived him of 
standing. Such an argument presumes several factors not in issue 
in this case, but fundamentally assumes that plaintiff could have 
joined another party. As appellant is fully aware, said party 
could not be located at all, much less brought within the 
jurisdiction of the court. Appellant's conduct in this matter was 
sufficiently egregious that to suggest to this court that she 
should be exonerated or entitled to another trial because there may 
be another victim who can't be located, is contrary to sound 
judicial policy and good reason. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the trial court's decision in 
this matter should be affirmed in all respects and appellee should 
be awarded his costs and attorneys fees in having to respond to 
this appeal. 
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